Taking Ukraine Seriously: On the Obstacles to Asking Why

Abstract

Following much of the contemporary academic and political debate on Ukraine, one quickly discovers that the only ideologically acceptable answer to the question “What has gone wrong in Ukraine?” is: Russia. It is not only the war itself that is analyzed exclusively through the lens of Russian imperialism – though this framing crowds out diverging accounts so insistently, that over four hundred prominent scholars of East European Studies have called to “read less about Ukrainian domestic politics and international relations" in order to “understand the sources of the Russo-Ukrainian War.” Ukraine's domestic problems and international relations, too, are often attributed to Russia across different registers: corruption at the highest levels of government is framed as a Soviet institutional legacy; criticism of domestic policy is dismissed as Kremlin narrative; Russophone Ukrainian citizens are described as victims of Russification; and even disputes with neighboring Poland over historical memory are not rarely attributed to Moscow's manipulation rather than to the unresolved complexities of a shared past and present of two neighboring states. The claim of Russia's responsibility over Ukrainian problems extends far into history – the most expansive accounts locate the original breaking point in the times of Kievan Rus – and spreads across every domain of analysis, functioning as an ontological premise underlying the dominant explanatory framework for what Ukraine as a state and society is.